The geography of the vote in Britain is in part a function of the geography of social class and other individual-level characteristics associated with vote choice. Since the proportion of working-class people is lower in the South than the North we expect support for Labour to be lower in the South than in the North.
only succeed in doing so by failing to control for sufficient individual-level factors. 6 Thus all contextual effects are a statistical artefact, and the authors provide a regression model to demonstrate their point. Others argue that social and regional context is redundant but use political attitudes to account for the effect of place. 7 This seems to be an inappropriate rejection of the possibility that attitude change is the causal mechanism through which a contextual effect operates.
One aim of this Note is to test for a class contextual effect that cannot be explained by controlling for further individual-level explanatory variables. This also requires controls for possible confounding factors. The most important of these is local economic prosperity. 8 People may vote for the economic benefit of their locality (sociotropic voting) but they may also vote in line with community interests in order to benefit personally from local prosperity. 9 Even if voters have no inclination to vote according to local needs, they probably have a greater awareness of issues that have a substantial local impact and this localized information may affect vote choice. Hence, people in more affluent areas may be less concerned about basic welfare and housing provision, because fewer people in their locality depend on state welfare and housing. In part this is why it is plausible to expect a contextual effect associated with the local levels of different types of housing tenure. Other possible confounding factors are more political. Parties may campaign more intensively for votes in some areas than others, and this may explain spatial patterns in vote choice. 10 Furthermore, incumbency and migration effects and also tactical voting could all confound a class contextual effect.
Even if one finds a measurable effect of the class composition of the locality on individual vote choice, the question remains as to what causal mechanism this operates through. There are three positions identifiable from the literature, which I will argue are only subtly different and have a common theme. First, there is that of Miller, who explained the impact of social class on voting as the result of linkage with two core classes. 11 Although there are relatively few actual members of the core classes (for whom class partisanship is very strong), others would vote more or less like those classes depending on their links with those classes. These links are formed through social interaction, and so family and friends are as important as the workplace in the development of partisanship.
The idea that partisanship is influenced by social interaction is strongly criticized by Dunleavy, who argues that people do not talk about politics with their neighbours sufficiently. 12 Whilst evidence for substantial political discussion with neighbours is lacking, studies have shown that any movement in voting behaviour tends to be in the direction of the opinion of those people interacted with most. 13 Moreover, Burbank shows that assessment of local partisan bias need not depend on the level of local social interaction.
14 Jones et al. are convinced of the importance of the social milieu, but instead of social interaction they refer to a more general process of 'political socialization'. 15 Political scientists and sociologists are content to describe the influence of parents on the partisanship of their children as the product of political socialization, without holding the view that politics is discussed at length in households. 16 This second position views residential milieu as extending the political socialization that occurs in the home. To this end various elements of the locality including local schools, churches and voluntary organizations may be relevant.
The third position is that taken by Butler and Stokes who suggest that, 'perceptions of class interest may impart to an area a political tendency that is exaggerated still further by the processes that form and sustain a local political culture. ' 17 Their position can be distinguished from that of Miller and Jones et al., since class linkage and political socialization do not require similarity of political attitudes in order to achieve conditioned voting behaviour, whereas the concept of local political culture clearly does. It would not make sense to talk of a common political culture that did not imply a degree of homogeneity in political attitudes. By contrast, association with a particular class may generate a partisan bias without the corresponding political attitudes, as demonstrated by Weakliem and Health. 18 At this point it seems that the distinctively class based aspect of the class contextual effect has been lost. If the true mechanism is social interaction, political socialization or local political culture, then what really matters is what the local partisan bias is and not why the locality has a particular partisan bias. If class context only matters in so far as it creates that bias, it is not really a class contextual effect that is under consideration but a contextual effect associated with partisanship. 19 The possibility of such a partisan reinforcement effect is therefore also tested. Here the authors show that there is a 'direct' effect of social class on vote choice even controlling for various political attitudes and economic factors. They suggest that, 'social influences may affect vote directly without operating through attitudes' (p. 243). It is possible that the class contextual effect identified in this Note explains part of the 'direct effect' of class that Weakliem and Heath identify. Since most members of a class live in areas where there is an above average proportion of members of that class, the class contextual effect strengthens the partisan tendency of the class for most members of the class. This is true for all classes and therefore class contextual effects have a tendency to increase the measured level of class voting. Therefore, if the class contextual effect, at least in part, operates through the transfer of partisanship without the corresponding political attitudes, then the measured effect is similar to that identified by Weakliem and Heath. 19 Only a process whereby people are inclined to vote with other people because of their class can constitute a class contextual effect in the strictest sense. Of the four theories outlined above, only that of Miller fits this description. However, even Miller does not rely much on the nature of different classes beyond the differing partisanship of classes.
D A T A A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y
The choice of election for this study was driven by technical methodological considerations. Proximity to the nearest census was important to ensure good measures of characteristics of the locality. This criterion suggested both the 1992 and 1983 general elections. The 1983 British Election Study (BES) was chosen because it had a considerably larger sample size than the 1992 BES. 20 The BES data were linked with local authority ward-level data from the 1981 census, 21 and also at the constituency level to data on campaign spending by the parties 22 and the election results for 1979 and 1983. 23 Since the census for Scotland is a separate project, creating inevitable difficulties in finding comparative data to that for the English and Welsh wards, it was necessary to restrict the scope of this Note to England and Wales. After excluding non-voters and residents of Scotland, deleting case and item non-response, the data file included 2,826 complete cases clustered in 227 polling districts (an average of 12.4 electors per district). Table 1 contains a list of the variables examined with descriptions. Level 2 refers to the district level and level 1 is the individual level.
The level 2 variables were selected for their potential as candidates for different contextual effects on vote choice. Their bivariate correlations are presented in Table 2 . The measures of class context are EMPMAN, PROFMAN, SALARIAT and WORKING. The first three are essentially all proxies for the same feature and are therefore highly correlated with each other and negatively correlated with WORKING. Similarly, OWNERS and COUNCIL have a natural negative correlation. Despite potential redundancy, all the variables were examined in the analysis since there was no reason to reject any one of them. Whilst the variables drawn from the census are highly correlated with each other, the party spending and vote shares are more modestly correlated with the census variables. This is partly explained by the fact that party spending and vote shares are measured at the constituency level rather than the ward/polling district level. Thus, the party spending and vote shares are far from ideal measures of campaign effort and partisan bias at the level of the polling district.
Multilevel logistic regression 24 was used as a more refined alternative to ordinary (single-level) logistic regression. Multilevel modelling enables more efficient treatment of hierarchical data, because the manner in which individuals at one level are in groups at another level is explicitly modelled. This has two main advantages. First, the use of clustering information enables more accurate estimation of the standard errors of the parameters. The standard errors are important for testing explanatory power and 20 A total of 3,618 interviews were achieved in England and Wales compared with only 2,577 in 1992. Maximum sample size was important to ensure good estimates of the level 2 random effects in the multilevel models. The 1983 BES data are contained in A. Heath, British Election Studies, 1969 Studies, -1987 significance testing is expected to be more 'conservative' in the multilevel models than in ordinary regression. Secondly, by estimating the random effects in the model at the group level as well as the individual level, and accepting explanatory variables at both levels, multilevel models can be used to explore how differences between districts may The multilevel logistic model has the form:
Correlations between the Level 2 Variables
where i is a Level 1 indicator, j is a Level 2 indicator, X ij is a vector of Level 1 explanatory variables (including a constant, 1), ␤ is a vector of coefficients associated with the Level 1 variables in X ij , Z j is a vector of Level 2 explanatory variables, B is a vector of coefficients associated with the Level 2 variables in Z j and u j is a Level 2 error term such that E(u j ) ϭ 0 and V (u j ) ϭ
2
. The term which distinguishes the model as a multilevel model is u j , the random error at Level 2, which reflects the unexplained variation between districts. Level 1 variation is constrained by assumption to be binomial variation. Although it may be thought that the model could be extended to a three-level model with REGION as a level, this would be inappropriate because regional effects are best conceived of and modelled as fixed effects rather than random effects. 26 Also, despite having variables measured at both the polling district and constituency levels, it does not make sense to distinguish between them in the model, since there is a one-to-one correspondence between polling district and constituency in the data.
The Science, 31 (1996) , 51-65. 26 Regions are not sampled (even hypothetically) from a population of regions. Regional effects are not expected to be random residual effects but specific fixed effects. In order to measure these the REGION variable was introduced as a set of dummy variables. Several combinations of regional effects were tested and several baseline or reference categories were also assessed. 27 'Other' refers to all other parties. Non-voters were excluded from the analysis. 28 The term Liberal is used to refer to the Liberal party, the significant explanatory variables is presented in Table 3 as Model A. 31 All of the terms in the fixed part of the model are interpreted in exactly the same way as for an ordinary (F'note continued) approximations and the Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) fitting procedure (Goldstein, Multilevel Statistical Models, chap. 5).
31 Insignificant variables were removed from the model in order to aid interpretation and improve stability of parameter estimates. Stepwise regression was not used but instead the analysis consisted of a process of testing and re-testing variables in combination with different sets of other variables. The only significance test used was the t-test for parameters in the fixed part of the model. Testing was at the 5 per cent significance level. The likelihood ratio test was not available, as the MLn calculation of the log likelihood for multilevel logistic regression models is unreliable (Goldstein, Multilevel Statistical Models, p. 103). In response to this problem I have re-estimated logistic regression. 32 A unit increase in the value of any variable implies an increase in the odds of voting Conservative by a multiplicative factor of exp . The random part of the model gives the variance estimates at the two levels. The level 2 term 2 is interpreted as the unexplained variation existing between districts.
Model A contains a variety of individual-level explanatory variables as well as district-level factors. The individual-level variables confirm the relevance of certain class cleavages, the importance of political socialization and the dominance of economic predictors of Conservative voting. The manual and non-manual classes had a different propensity to vote Conservative, while farmers and the petty bourgeoisie with employees were considerably more Conservative than the rest of the population. Social class was still found to be an important predictor of the vote even controlling for housing tenure, perceived income, car ownership, private health insurance, trade-union membership (including spouse's trade-union membership) and private/public employment status. The importance of political socialization is highlighted by the fact that father's party, mother's party and age (for older persons) were significant in the model. Finally, graduates were dramatically less likely to vote Conservative than others ceteris paribus, due to their known tendency to vote for the Liberal/SDP Alliance. 33 The class contextual effect in Model A is a consensual one. The more employers or managers there were in a voter's district the more likely that voter was to vote Conservative. Since the model includes controls for the individual's social class, we know that people from the same social class were more or less likely to vote Conservative depending on the class composition of their locality. The possibility of an interaction effect (of the kind postulated by Przeworski and Soares) between individual and district-level class variables was also tested. This involved a set of interaction terms between EMPMAN and the four Goldthorpe-Heath class indicators in Model A -'Petty Bourgeoisie with Employees', Farmers, Skilled Manual and 'Semi and Unskilled Manual'. 34 All four interaction parameters were insignificant. So we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the class contextual effect was of the same magnitude and in the same direction for all voters independently of which class they came from. This is contrary to the Przeworski and Soares model of class compositional effects, whereby the working classes are consensual in their response to the social milieu but the middle classes are reactive. Furthermore, the result also contradicts a less radical proposition that some classes were more sensitive to the class composition of their environment than others.
The model identifies two regions as distinct in their voting behaviour compared with other regions. In the Midlands, given the class composition of the locality, the propensity to vote Conservative was higher than elsewhere in England controlling for various individual-level effects. The measurable effect of living in a Welsh rather than English constituency on the propensity to vote Conservative was, on average, negative. Although (F'note continued) Model A using Gibbs sampling implemented in a package called BUGS from D. Spiegelhalter, A. Thomas, N. Best and W. Gilks, Bayesian Inference Using Gibbs Sampling (BUGS) Manual (Software available from MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge, 1996) . The estimates of the parameters in the fixed part of the model converge to those given by MLn, but convergence was not reached for the estimate of the Level 2 variance parameter. There are good technical reasons why convergence of the variance parameter is difficult to achieve. 32 34 An interaction term is essentially the product of two variables (here, EMPMAN and a class indicator), which is included in the model as an explanatory variable. the class contextual effect was strong in England, sensitivity to class context was far greater in Wales. Whilst a 1 per cent increase in the percentage of employers or managers would increase the odds of voting Conservative by 3 per cent in England, the corresponding increase in Wales was 14 per cent. 35 The presence of district level variables in the model constitutes evidence for contextual effects on the propensity to vote Conservative. Even when all the Level 1 explanatory variables are used as controls, the coefficients of the Level 2 variables are still significant and very similar in magnitude to those in Model A. The question is, does this refute the Kelley and McAllister claim that contextual effects are a statistical artefact -the result of a failure to control for sufficient individual-level explanatory variables? There is clearly a sense in which the Kelley and McAllister proposition is irrefutable. Whilst there are always further individual-level factors that could be controlled for, it is possible to achieve a position where further controls are deemed unlikely to have any major effect and introducing them into the model would generate instability in the parameter estimates. I would argue that the control variables listed in Table 1 (which include all of those used by Kelley and McAllister) are more than sufficient to show that the contextual effects in Model A are not a statistical artefact. Hence the Kelley and McAllister hypothesis should be rejected in so far as it applies to Conservative voting in England and Wales at the 1983 general election.
E X P L O R I N G T H E N A T U R E O F C O N T E X T U A L E F F E C T S
Thus far the EMPMAN term has been assumed to indicate that there is an effect of the class context on the propensity to vote Conservative. An alternative explanation is that people who were more likely to vote Conservative than could be predicted by their individual characteristics have migrated to areas with high proportions of employers or managers.
McMahon et al. describe how migrants between the North and South are likely to vote differently to their counterparts in their region of origin, but they note that 'in the absence of any political conversion, migration would have increased the North-South divide by around one point.' 36 The size of the migrating population relative to that staying in the same region is so small that it can have negligible electoral impact. The reverse effect was posited by Brown who shows that in the United States migrants increasingly acquire the partisanship of their place of destination with increasing time spent there. 37 However, McMahon et al. argue that in Britain change in the local context cannot explain the effect of migration on migrants and the vast majority of migration did not involve a change of local context. Thus, migration effects cannot explain the association between class context and Conservative voting, and hence causality is predominantly from place to person.
For a greater understanding of the contextual effects, Model A is inadequate and we look instead at the contextual variables separately. Six of the continuous level 2 variables (i.e. all those excluding REGION) had a significant association with the odds of voting Conservative once regional effects and the individual-level effects in Model A 35 The 3 per cent rise in England is given in the exponentiated coefficient of EMPMAN of 1.0304. The corresponding increase in Wales is given by the exponential of the sum of the EMPMAN were controlled for. These were EMPMAN, SALARIAT, PROFMAN, NOCAR, CONSPEND and CON83SH. As previously noted, the first three of these four variables measure class context and are naturally highly correlated. Among these variables EMPMAN was selected because the effect was strongest. 38 The fourth, NOCAR, measures the proportion of people in the constituency who did not own or have a car for use in their household. The fifth significant variable, CONSPEND, measures the proportion of the legal maximum that the Conservative party spent on campaigning in that constituency. Finally, the sixth, CON83SH is the Conservative share of the vote in the constituency in 1983.
These effects did not operate independently, however. Multicollinearity explains why EMPMAN and NOCAR were not both significant when included in the model together. High correlation between measures of class context and NOCAR implies that the effects of these variables confound each other. NOCAR could be thought of as an indicator of the economic prosperity of the district but not exclusively so. 39 Existing literature supports an effect of another indicator of prosperity, the local level of unemployment, 40 and this variable was found to be significant here when the model was estimated on the data for England alone. Thus, contextual effects associated with both the local rates of unemployment and car ownership are present, but the economic context clearly had a weaker influence than class composition. Within Model A, therefore, EMPMAN represents an indicator of both class context and local economic prosperity but primarily the former. 41 Multicollinearity was not such a problem between EMPMAN and CONSPEND. Model B in Table 4 shows that CONSPEND was very nearly significant and the campaign spending effect would most likely be much stronger if a measure at the level of the polling district
Multilevel Logistic Models B and C Notes: N ϭ 2,826. Only the Level 2 parameters for these models are presented. The individual level variables and variance structure are the same as those in Model A and the parameter estimates for them are similar. All variables are significant at the 5 per cent level. 38 The term 'stronger' is used in the sense that the contrast between voting in those districts towards the top of the EMPMAN range and those near the bottom is greater than the contrast for other census variables. 39 Car ownership varies for reasons other than simple economic resources. NOCAR brings out an urban-rural contrast since, controlling for economic prosperity, car ownership is higher in rural areas than urban areas. were available. Since both variables are acceptable in the same model and the coefficient of EMPMAN is largely unchanged from Model A, the effects of Conservative campaign spending was largely independent of the class contextual effect.
The theory supporting a partisan reinforcement effect is partly that regarding the mechanisms underlying a class contextual effect as argued in the introduction. CON83SH had the strongest effect of all the contextual variables under consideration and is shown in Model C in Table 4 . This effect would be likely to appear even stronger if a better measure of the partisan bias at the level of the polling district could be found. This shows that partisan bias in the constituency will tend to be exaggerated but leaves the question of how or why unanswered. None of the contextual effects associated with other variables have a measurable effect above and beyond the partisan reinforcement effect (i.e. they are not significant if introduced into Model C). Thus, the partisan reinforcement effect should be understood as partly the product of the mechanisms that produce the class contextual effect and others.
The strategic situation may also influence the Conservative vote in a constituency. Heath et al. estimate the level of tactical voting in 1983 (including Scotland) at about 5.6 per cent; 36 per cent of the tactical votes were for the Conservatives, whilst 11 per cent were tactical votes by Conservatives for another party. 42 So, on average the effect of tactical voting was to increase the Conservative share by 1.4 per cent. 43 It is more difficult to estimate how tactical votes were distributed across constituencies, but they ought to have a similar effect to a partisan bias effect. The stronger the Conservatives are in a constituency, the more likely they are to receive tactical votes and vice versa. Thus, tactical voting contributes to partisan reinforcement, but, since the average level of tactical voting was relatively small, this factor could not confound a class contextual effect substantially. Similarly, although there is evidence for an incumbency effect, 44 it is possible to control for this approximately using notional 1979 results. The effect of the Conservatives having won in 1979 was insignificant after controlling for EMPMAN, so incumbency does not confound the class contextual effect although it may have contributed to a partisan reinforcement effect.
I M P L I C A T I O N S F O R T H E U N D E R S T A N D I N G O F R E G I O N A L E F F E C T S
It is clear from Models A and B that after controlling for various individual-level variables and class composition, there is no evidence for a general North-South divide in 1983. What was previously identified as a contextual effect of region, including the North-South divide, can be explained with reference to a class contextual effect which has a differential impact across the regions. Figure 1 shows the distribution of employers and managers in 1983 across the regions. There is a clear pattern whereby regions in the South had high proportions of employers or managers, while regions in the North had relatively low proportions of the same. A consensual class contextual effect implies that people in the South were more likely than similar counterparts in the North to vote Conservative as a result of the class contextual effect alone. Thus, a region effect can be derived from the operation of a class contextual effect.
Fig. 1. Bar chart of the mean of the percentage of employers or managers in a ward, by region
Standard Region N ϭ 227 districts Models A and B highlight Wales and the Midlands as exceptions to the general rule. These exceptions are difficult to account for by means of testable theories. Welsh nationalism and non-conformism may explain a general anti-Conservative sentiment that cannot be accounted for by individual-level characteristics. This could also constitute evidence for the core-periphery cleavage that Bogdanor and Field argue for. 45 The Welsh may not have been more sensitive to class context than the English, as suggested by the interaction EMPMAN*Wales in Model A. Instead, differences in contextual effects within Wales may have had more to do with the peculiarly strong Labour partisanship of mining communities in South Wales in contrast with the more middle-class and rural nature of central and North Wales. Why the Midlands should have been more Conservative than everywhere else in 1983 is a more difficult problem which is also more persistent, as it appears as a significant exception to the general rule in all three models. 46 If class contextual effects really do explain regional effects in 1983, then they should also explain trends in regional effects across elections. The North-South divide widened between 1983 and 1987 and remained similar in 1992 but declined dramatically in 1997. 47 The nature of class contextual effects may change over time in four ways. 
Mean of EMPMAN
if the association between class and vote weakens, then we should expect the class contextual effect to weaken. This may help explain changes between 1992 and 1997. Secondly, if there are changes in the geographic distribution of social classes, the pattern created by a class contextual effect will change. Thirdly, if the class contextual effect is in part a contextual effect of local economic prosperity, then a change in the association between class composition and the economic conditions of the locality will affect the resulting contextual effect. Finally, the sensitivity of individuals to their context may change over time and this would alter any contextual effects based on class composition or otherwise. Spatial differences in voting behaviour are both complex and vary over time. 48 Contextual effects, such as those described here, can only ever explain the general pattern, and testing trends in regional differences requires analysis of data from several elections. None the less, our understanding of the geography of voting is improved if we can link these differences to generalized contextual effects rather than leave them as unexplained.
Using a multilevel analysis of the Conservative vote in 1983, this Note demonstrates a number of points. Voters with similar individual characteristics voted differently in different parts of Britain. The class composition of the locality is important because it imparts to an area a partisan bias that is self-reinforcing by a variety of causal mechanisms, including social interaction, political socialization and the generation of a local political culture. Since these mechanisms depend primarily on the partisan bias rather than on the class basis of that bias, the class contextual effect can be thought of as a partisan reinforcement effect. However, people also respond to their local economic conditions, the local election campaigns and to the strategic situation. All of these processes may also contribute to a partisan reinforcement effect. Thus, a measurable partisan reinforcement effect, although demonstrable, can leave questions regarding the nature of contextual effects unanswered.
Whilst it is important to separate the mechanisms which underlie contextual effects, it is also interesting to note the exceptions to the general rule. All of the above processes are examples of 'uniform' contextual effects in the sense that the process is the same across the country, although the impact on voters in different places will differ. For example, the North-South divide in 1983 can be conceived of as the product of a class contextual effect that was uniform across the country. By way of contrast, the Midlands and Wales differed from the rest of England in the operation of this contextual effect. The contextual effects appear, therefore, to have been different in these places and not uniform. Yet, within regions, the contextual effects operated equally on voters. No evidence was found to suggest that the class context affected members of different classes differently. These are finer than the standard regions used here. The disadvantage of using these fine schemas in this study is that the identification of regions is in part based on the factors that constitute contextual effects. This creates difficulties in separating general contextual effects from specifically local features. 1 He reported that left-right positions were important determinants of voters' party choices at the 1992 general election, and that these could only partly be linked to social class.
Inconsistent Individual Attitudes within Consistent
In his presentation of the Miller-Shanks model, Bartle refers to party identification and ideological positions as stable attitudes, 2 and to the left-right scale used in his tests (derived from the British Election Study, BES) as a 'measure of stable predispositions'. 3 The implication is that people have relatively permanent positions on the items used to identify their attitudes, so that these are valuable predictors of voting behaviour, of considerable use in the development of causal models. In his conclusions, however, Bartle observed that as the same items used in his 1992 analysis were also employed in the 1997 BES, 'It will therefore be possible to use panel data to check if the relationships reported here are stable'. 4 He further noted that:
It will also be possible to use panel data to establish what causes voters to shift their left-right positions. If these positions are found to be stable, or to shift only in response to changes in social characteristics, then this will support the assumptions behind the recursive models … [tested in his paper]. If, however, left-right positions shift in response to short-term factors, like policy preferences and evaluations of current conditions, then it may be necessary to formulate more complicated models based on non-recursive models. Attitude
: that they agreed with it on both occasions may be much more important than the variations in the strength of their agreement over time. Because Bartle used five-point scales, most of our analysis focuses on that same degree of distinction but to test whether our conclusions are peculiar to that scale, however, we also report on tests at a coarser scale derived by collapsing the five-point scales (given in the Appendix) to three-point scales. The conclusions remain largely unaltered although, like Bartle, we have not used a clear threshold to separate out stability from instability, consistency from inconsistency: for us the greater the amount of change in people's reported attitudes, the greater the amount of instability/inconsistency. 6 For these explorations of changes in people's attitudes we use a large panel survey of the British adult population that has been operating since 1991, based on an initial survey of about 5,000 households and about 10,000 individuals. Early studies of data from the first few annual waves of this survey -the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) -have shown considerable instability in reported party identification (another of the relatively stable predispositions according to the 'funnel of causation' model), 7 and suggested similar instability in reported attitudes. 8 Six waves of interview data are now available, and these are deployed here to inquire into the degree of stability on two sets of attitude scales, using data for the 6,419 individuals who completed all six surveys. The period involved, 1991-96, was one of considerable change in British politics, with the gathering decline in the Conservative party's popularity that led to its defeat in 1997 after eighteen years in power, for example, much public concern over the nature of government and politicians, and a major restructuring of the Labour party's position on a range of issues, all of which may have influenced people's social and political attitudes and contributed to any observed instability. The purpose of this Note is to present the empirical material only, however, as a descriptive prolegomenon to the important research task essayed by Bartle which will include exploring the links between attitudinal shifts and the wider socio-political environment.
B R I T I S H A T T I T U D E S I N T H E 1 9 9 0 S
The BHPS uses two sets of attitudinal questions of direct relevance to investigations of voting behaviour, which are employed in alternate waves: one covers social issues, with six items that were asked in 1991, 1993 and 1995; the other covers four political issues, asked in 1992, 1994 and 1996. Five of the first set are common with five of the six employed in Bartle's study. (The full questions are given in the Appendix to this paper.) 9 6 It may be possible to devise norms against which to compare observed patterns of change, either theoretically (if a relevant theoretical approach can be identified) or randomly. 9 These five-point scales have been widely used in studies of the British electorate over the last two decades, and it is generally assumed (implicitly in almost every case) that the degree of agreement-disagreement that they Table 1 
with the statements in most cases; the largest percentage was 21.3, for the statement on 'one law for the rich and one for the poor', and the great majority were less than 10. Most respondents were in the central three columns of the scales, therefore. On the social issues, there was a relatively wide spread of opinions on most, and on none was there agreement among even half of the respondents: in no case was the modal category the neutral one (N). On the political issues, by contrast, over half of the respondents gave the same answer in three of the four cases and many fewer took the neutral stance of 'neither agree nor disagree'. But how many of them changed their positions over the following four years?
D E S C R I P T I V E S T A T I S T I C S O F C H A N G E
Tables 2-5 provide basic data on the stability-instability of attitudes. On the simplest measure -the percentage of respondents who gave the same reply on the five-point scale at each of two dates -they show that on average only about half gave the same response on the two occasions when they were asked the same question ( Table 2 ). The percentages are very clustered, with none below 40 or over 57. Respondents were slightly more consistent in their responses to the political issues questions asked in 1992-94-96 than to the social issues set, but the differences are small. In sum, about half of the respondents gave different answers to the ten questions from those which they had provided in a previous year.
T A B L E 1
The Giving the same response in each year may be considered a very strong test of consistency, however, so Table 2 also reports on two other tests. The first uses the percentages who gave the same or an adjacent response on the five-point scale (i.e. for those who gave 'strongly agree' at the first date we count those who gave either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' at the second, for those who gave 'agree' at the first, we count those who gave 'strongly agree', 'agree' or 'neither agree nor disagree' at the second, etc.). These show that on average about 80 per cent gave a response at the second date less than two points or more away from the previous response, again suggesting substantial inconsistency in attitudes over relatively short periods.
Finally, Table 2 reports the percentages giving the same responses when the scales are collapsed to just three points (combining 'strongly agree' with 'agree' and 'strongly disagree' with 'disagree'). On average, more than a third of respondents gave a different response in one year to that given previously, with slightly greater variation on the social than on the political issue questions. Clearly, there was greater 'stability' at this coarser scale than that observed using the five-point scale but a very substantial minority of the respondents made a significant shift in their responses, which is strong circumstantial evidence of instability.
The differences between questions were consistent across all three tests among the social issues items: for example, respondents were much more consistent in their views on whether there is 'one law for the rich and one for the poor' than they were on both whether 'private enterprise solves economic problems' and 'public services ought to be state-owned', which perhaps reflects on the political milieu of the early-mid 1990s. There was much less variation among the four political issues items, however. Table 3 looks at each possible response to the questions, and indicates the percentages giving the same answer in all of the relevant years: the final column indicates the percentage giving the same response to the item on each of the three occasions when it was posed, and the other columns break that percentage down by the different answers. Using the five-point scale, slightly less than a third gave the same response on each occasion, with relatively little variability across the questions, especially those on social issues. Greatest consistency was in the 'agree' and 'disagree' responses, though in only one case did more than 25 per cent of the respondents give the same reply three times (to the statement 'ordinary people can't influence government') and very few either strongly agreed or strongly disagreed on every occasion the question was asked.
People whose response was in the modal category for an item were much more likely to give the same response on the next occasion it was placed before them than were those who took a minority position. This is illustrated here using the three-point scale only, with the political issues data. Some 58 per cent disagreed (including strongly disagreed) with the statement that 'Government reflects the will of the people' in 1992, for example (Table 1) , and of these 80 per cent disagreed again in 1994 (Table 4) , whereas of the 21 per cent who agreed with the statement in the first of those years, only 38 per cent agreed again in 1994. The same pattern occurs for each of the other items in that group, for each pair of years, very clearly indicating that much of the variation in attitudes occurs among those who hold the least popular views. This clearly suggests a topic for further investigation: the implication is that the variation in attitudes is not random but instead that the majority view is more firmly held, across the population as a whole, than are the minority views.
Finally in this set of descriptive data, Table 5 gives the cross-year correlations in responses, both for adjacent surveys (two years apart) and for the beginning-and end-year surveys (four years apart), for both the five-point and the three-point scales. The coefficients are consistent and relatively low -averaging 0.47 for the social issues items and 0.39 for the political issues: there is virtually no difference between the averages for the five-and three-point scales. On average, therefore, only 22 per cent (0.47 2 ) of the variation in responses to the social issues questions in one year can be accounted for by variation in responses to the same questions in a previous year, and just 15 per cent of the variation in the political issues questions. This confirms the patterns identified in Tables 2 and 3 : there was substantial variability in the responses to these ten questions over three occasions when they were used. At face value, this casts considerable doubt on the assumption that British voters have 'stable predispositions': * AB, agreeing in both years; NB, neither agreeing nor disagreeing in both years; DB, disagreeing in both years.
a more likely interpretation, however, is that the scaling instruments analysed here and employed in several of the major surveys of British attitudes are not very good tools for identifying any underlying 'stable predispositions' or 'values' on basic moral and political issues, which it is assumed most have.
D E R I V E D S C A L E S
Batteries of questionnaire items on social, political and other issues are generally reduced to scales for analytical purposes, such as Bartle's left-right scale. We have derived scales from each data set for each year, using principal components analysis. This method was preferred to Bartle's of allocating a value 1-5 to each response and summing them, for two reasons. First, it provides a test of whether a single scale best represents the variation across all responses to the various items; 11 secondly, the component scores can be standardized to the mean for each analysis, so that comparisons of individuals' positions on the scales over time are independent of any overall secular trends in responses to the questions. Table 6 gives the varimax rotated loadings for the two-component solutions derived from each of the twelve analyses, six each for the five-point and three-point scales.
12
The clear implication is of very considerable consistency over time in the aggregate structure of attitudes. Of the six items included in the social issues analysed at the five-point scale, for example, the largest difference between the highest loading across the three dates is 0.04 (for the fifth item) and on the sixth item the loading on the first component is 0.73 in each case: consistency is the dominant feature of the three-point scale analyses too. There is slightly more variability in the political issues loadings matrices: the maximum difference at the five-point scale is only 0.09 (on the second item), but the second item loads more heavily on the second component in the 1996 analysis but the first in the other two on the three-point scale. 10 On which see Elinor Scarbrough, Political Ideology and Voting: An Exploratory Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 11 Bartle, 'Left-Right Position Matters', reports (p. 527) tests which justified his assumption of a single scale, but our analyses have identified two.
12 Two-component solutions were selected because they had two components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. With the slight caveat introduced by the second item on the three-point political issues scale, the implication to be drawn from this table, in apparent contradiction to that drawn above from Tables 2-5, is of very considerable stability in attitude structures. This, however, is at the aggregate as opposed to the individual level: individuals appear to be quite variable in their attitudes, but the overall structure of attitudes in the population as a whole is very stable. In other words, we have identified an apparent paradox -very great consistency in the structure of attitudes over time at the aggregate (or ecological) level, but considerable inconsistency at the individual level. Because the aggregate structure of attitudes remains consistent across years at any one level, however, the changes at the individual level are not entirely random: changes on items with high of the social issues attitude scales between any pair of years, with an average of around 45 per cent similarly remaining in the same relative position on each of the political issues scales (Table 8 ). If movement of 1.0 standard score or less is taken as an indicator of stability, then between 70 and 80 per cent of all respondents were so classified. A shift of one standard score involves a move in relative position of some 33 per cent, however, which is a substantial shift (two-thirds of the individuals in a normally-distributed distribution are within one standard deviation of the mean): 13 furthermore, between 3.7 and 6.8 per cent of all individuals moved two standard score positions or more -which is from one extreme of the frequency distribution to the other. Not only are people inconsistent in their responses to the attitudinal items, therefore, but some of them are very inconsistent.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Bartle's important paper is based on an assumption regarding the stability of British voters' attitudes. This Note has indicated that the assumption does not stand up to critical examination, using similar data to those employed by Bartle but drawn from panel rather than cross-sectional studies. This does not invalidate his argument, far from it: as he himself notes, if the assumption is invalid then more sophisticated modelling strategies must be used if we are to understand the determinants of British voting behaviour.
14 Two implications could be drawn from our findings: either there is substantial inconsistency in many individuals' attitudes over relatively short periods of time, 15 despite the aggregate consistency, or the instruments widely used in Britain to explore certain attitudes are not very good at that task. (It is possible, of course, for both to be correct.) Such findings raise a number of other important questions that should be the focus of further research into attitude stability/instability. Salient among them are:
1. Are the variations in reported attitudes linked to changes in respondents' 'objective' and/or 'subjective' conditions -such as changes in their socio-economic and employment status and in their local milieux -and if so why, or are they random outcomes, which may cast considerable doubt on the validity of the widely-used items for identifying and scaling left-right attitudes? 16 2. Is there a valid division of the population into those with consistent and those with inconsistent attitudes, with implications for the reliability of predictive models of voting and other behaviour, or should respondents be scaled in 'degree of inconsistency'? 17 3. Were changes in responses to the items used in the BHPS (and similar surveys such as the BES and the BSA) likely in the first half of the 1990s, given the political events then, such as the replacement of Margaret Thatcher by John Major, the unexpected Conservative election victory in 1992, loss of confidence in government economic policy after September 1992, and the 'creation' of New Labour under Tony Blair after 1994? If so, this also casts considerable doubt on the validity of the questionnaire items for tapping 'stable predispositions' -assuming that they exist: the overall response to each item changed little over the six years, however.
18 14 The instability in attitudes may be linked to other shifts in opinion. Sanders and Brynin ('The Dynamics of Party Preference Change'), using the BHPS social issues data employed here, have shown that shifts in attitudes over the period 1991-95 were linked to changing partisan preferences, and were also linked to people's perceptions of their economic situations. Some of the instability reported here is undoubtedly reflected in their findings, but the extent of the instability that we have uncovered suggests that there is much more variability in reported attitudes than in partisan preferences. 15 A third possibility, that the population has shifted its attitudes over time, can be discounted from the findings of the principal components analyses, which hold any such shifts constant. 16 One reason why they are probably not random is given by the component structures. Because of their great consistency, the implication is that people's changes on one item are closely correlated with their changes on other items that go to make up the same attitudinal scale. Attitudinal change is directional rather than random, it seems. On survey attitude measurement issues, see D. 17 Bartle has essayed such an exploration of population heterogeneity himself, though not using attitude stability as the basis for dividing the population. He divided his sample according to their level of awareness of political issues, and was better able to predict both attitudes and voting for the more than for the less aware: J. Bartle, 'Political Awareness and Heterogeneity in Models of Voting: Some Evidence from the British Election Studies', in Pattie et al., eds, British Elections and Parties Review 7, pp. 1-22. 18 For each of the four items used for the political issues scales, the index of dissimilarity between 1992 and 1996 was 7.1, 4.9, 9.1 and 7.7 respectively, indicating that there was an average net shift by only one person in fourteen: the largest difference was for the statement, 'Government ought to impose an earnings ceiling,' and the smallest for, 'Ordinary people can't influence government.' (On the latter 20.8 per cent agreed or disagreed in 1992 compared with 18.1 in 1996: the 1994 figure was 16.5.)
A substantial volume of work is needed to address these questions and identify the causes of the apparent paradox identified here with regard to stable predispositions at the aggregate scale but considerable inconsistency at the individual level.
The data presented here suggest further evidence of the existence of ecological fallacies in the investigation of so many aspects of social life. The fallacy most often noted is the classic one of incorrectly inferring characteristics of individuals from knowledge of the aggregate characteristics of the population of which they are members. 19 But Alker identified five others. 20 One of those is the cross-sectional fallacy, which assumes that what is observed at one time applies to other times also. The fallacy identified here combines the cross-sectional and the classical ecological fallacies, however; although there is a very consistent aggregate pattern at several points in time (as indicated by the principal component structures in Table 4) , not all of the individuals in the population concerned are consistent in their responses to the attitude items from which those aggregate scales are constructed. There is individual-level inconsistency within aggregate consistency, posing a substantial research problem for those seeking to appreciate the structures that underpin political life and a significant complicating factor for those who assume that stable attitudes are important stimuli to voting choices. British voters have left-right attitudinal predispositions, but individuals vary considerably over short periods of time on how left-wing or right-wing their predispositions are.
Finally, these substantive findings regarding inconsistency within consistency are based on the assumption that the items used in the BHPS are valid measures of individuals' attitudes, to which they can respond in consistent ways. It may be that they are not, that the degree of sophistication in the level of agreement-disagreement that they call for is too great for many respondents. Such items have a long pedigree in British voting studies but, like the issue of partisan identification, to which John Bartle has also drawn our attention recently, 21 it may be that our data collection procedures are insufficiently precise to capture the theoretical constructs for which they have been designed and that more work is needed on measurement issues than has been undertaken to date by British students of political attitudes and voting behaviour. As is so often the case in the conclusion to a paper on such issues, more research is needed.
A P P E N D I X : T H E B H P S Q U E S T I O N S A N A L Y S E D
Social Issues 1991 Issues -1993 Issues -1995 People have different views about society. I'm going to read out some things people have said about Britain today and I'd like you to tell me which answer off the card comes closest to how you feel about each statement. It is widely accepted that survey data tend to underestimate the levels of support for political parties or other groups that are perceived to advocate 'extreme' views. In this Note I propose the use of latent class analysis as a means by which this difficulty might be overcome and I illustrate it by an application to the case of support within Northern Ireland for Sinn Féin. In the next section of the Note latent class analysis is described and its application to studies of voting or party support is explained. The following sections focus on the problem of gauging support for Sinn Féin from survey data and apply latent class analysis to a recent dataset from Northern Ireland. The Note concludes with some general remarks on the question of why surveys and elections disagree and the role of latent class analysis in explaining this phenomenon.
L A T E N T C L A S S A N A L Y S I S
Latent class analysis (henceforth LCA) is a statistical technique which models the relationships between sets of categorical or ordinal variables as arising from the common influence of an unobserved, latent variable, having two or more categories or classes. For example, given a significant relationship between three categorical variables, A, B and C, a LCA would model this relationship as arising from their common dependence on a latent variable, X. This implies that the three manifest variables, A, B and C, are then independent of each other, conditional on their relationship with X. There is here a strong parallel with factor analysis, where it is similarly assumed that a set of manifest variables are correlated only by virtue of their common dependence on an unobserved factor. The parallel extends further because, just as with factor analysis, one can then attempt to identify the latent classes on the basis of the relationship between X and the manifest variables. LCA can be applied to the problem of the under-representation in surveys of supporters of 'extreme' political parties because it allows us to identify classes of such supporters. What is required is that the survey includes items that capture respondents' positions on those policy dimensions that discriminate between the different political parties. Taking these as the manifest variables in a LCA should then allow us to uncover classes supporting each political party -at any rate to the extent to which these parties pursue distinctive policies. These classes are aggregates of individuals who adopt a more or less common set of positions on the measured policy dimensions. Members of a latent class can be identified as a class of supporters of a given party to the extent that their common set of positions matches those taken by that party. By looking at the relationship between latent class membership and party support as stated in a survey it may therefore be possible to uncover supporters of 'extreme' parties who claim to support more moderate ones.
The application of LCA is straightforward. The requirement is a crosstabulation of * Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Fiesole.
the manifest variables together with a specification of the number of categories or classes in the latent variable. 1 The model is then estimated using an iterative procedure that should converge to give a maximum likelihood solution. In practice many of the iterative procedures (including the one used here) employ the ML algorithm and treat the problem as one of missing data (that is to say, the latent variable is treated as a missing variable). The goodness of fit of the model is tested using conventional measures for contingency tables such as chi-square, the likelihood ratio chi-square (often called 'the deviance'), and other more ad hoc statistics such as the index of dissimilarity. When latent class analysis is applied inductively it is usual to start with a specification of two latent classes and then to increase this so as to improve the fit of the model. The aim is to arrive at a specification that is parsimonious but nevertheless provides an adequate fit to the observed data. LCA yields two pieces of information that are of particular importance in this application. These are the relative size of each latent class; and the probability of a respondent being in a given category of a manifest variable, conditional on his or her latent class membership. On these statistical methods, McCutcheon is an excellent introductory text; Clogg is a good review; and Vermunt 2 is a very good advanced text.
V O T I N G F O R S I N N F É I N
In reply to questionnaires, Northern Ireland people express more moderate views than they really hold. For instance, the middle-of-the-road Alliance Party consistently gets more support in opinion polls than it does in elections, while an extreme party like Sinn Féin gets less.
received by each party in the 1992 UK general election) demonstrates that levels of support for Sinn Féin in the survey are markedly lower than their share of the vote in elections. 4 Support for the Alliance party, and for 'Other' parties, is exaggerated in the survey while, for the remaining parties, their levels of support in NISA are consistent with their share of the vote at the general election.
It seems likely that this discrepancy arises because some Sinn Féin supporters misrepresent themselves to interviewers. This possibility has long been suspected, and Evans and Duffy 5 have suggested that, in the NISA survey, some Sinn Féin supporters report themselves as supporting the SDLP. I test this hypothesis using LCA with data from a sample of 3,023 adults aged between 21 and 65 interviewed in the Northern Ireland Social Mobility (NISM) survey, 1996-97. 6 The NISM survey asked respondents a number of questions about their political views, party support and constitutional preferences. In particular, respondents were asked which party (from an extensive list) they would be most likely to support 'if there was a general election tomorrow'.
Because almost all Sinn Féin supporters are Catholics 7 I focus on Catholic respondents. Among them the responses to the party support item in the NISM are 11.9 per cent support for Sinn Féin; 50.6 per cent for the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and 15.5 per cent supporting other parties. The remaining 22.1 per cent support no party or refuse to answer or say that they do not know (I henceforth refer to this group as 'None'). The ratio of SDLP to Sinn Féin support is thus 4.25:1. At the two nearest elections -to the Northern Ireland Assembly, in May 1996, and the UK general election in May 1997 -the ratio was much lower: 1.38 in the former (where the SDLP received 21.4 per cent of the total vote and Sinn Féin 15.5 per cent) and 1.5 in the latter (SDLP 24 per cent, Sinn Féin 16 per cent). 8 A P P L Y I N G L C A Our application of latent class analysis for this particular purpose is based on the early work of Ekholm and Palmgren 9 who developed a latent class model for the analysis of a binary response model where the response was subject to misclassification. In our case the response is party support, which I assume to be subject to misclassification in that some Sinn Féin supporters have been classified as choosing other response options. The model thus has two parts. Latent party support (X) is taken to be a function of a set of three categorical explanatory variables (Z 1 to Z 3 ). Reported party preference, Y is linked to X according to a set of classification probabilities.
The variables I use are as follows. Y (the response to the question asking which party a respondent would vote for if there were a general election tomorrow) distinguishes three groups: Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the Nones. Note that I drop from the analysis those who support another party (such as the Alliance). In part this is because the focus is on the ratio of support for a party whose electoral and survey support differ widely (Sinn Féin) and one whose support is relatively invariant as between them (the SDLP). In addition, preliminary analyses did not indicate that Sinn Féin supporters report themselves as favouring the Alliance. The three explanatory variables were all chosen because it was believed that they would discriminate between Catholics supporting Sinn Féin and those supporting the SDLP. They are as follows, together with the categorization of the responses as they were used in the analysis: For the variable UNINATID no Catholics gave the response 'Unionist'. This then gives us a four-way crosstabulation of party preference (Y; three categories indexed by i ϭ 1, …, 3) by NIRELAND (Z 1 ; three categories, indexed by j ϭ 1, … 3) by UNINATID (Z 2 ; two categories, indexed k ϭ 1,2) by NINATID (Z 3 ; three categories, indexed l ϭ 1, …, 3). The three dimensions captured by the Z variables -namely constitutional preferences, sense of national identity, and of sectarian identity -are all major factors that structure party support within both the sectarian groups in Northern Ireland. In this case, because Sinn Féin supporters are more strongly nationalist in outlook I would expect them to have a higher probability of giving the responses 'Reunify with the rest of Ireland'; 'Nationalist' and 'Irish' than would SDLP supporters. The latent class model can then be written as
where F is the expected frequency in the five-dimension table of the four manifest plus one latent variable, and the s are parameters to be estimated. The latent variable, X, has m categories, and I fitted the model several times, increasing the number of latent classes, until a satisfactory fit was found. The terms in Equation 1 are a constant term, a set of main effect terms for all five manifest and latent variables, and the set of two-way The model was estimated in GLIM4 using specially written macros and the results are reported in Table 2 . Note that a model with one latent class is simply the model of independence among the four manifest variables. As Table 2 shows, a model with four latent classes gave an adequate fit to the data. A model with three classes failed to fit the data at the p Ͻ 0.05 level, while a model with five classes did not yield a significant improvement in fit over the four-class model (change in deviance of 3.97 with 8 df, p ϭ 0.860). Table 3 shows the relative sizes of the four latent classes and also the estimated conditional probabilities of giving a particular response to each of the manifest variables, conditional on being in each of the four latent classes. Inspection of the conditional probabilities shows that the largest (class 4) and third largest (class 2) of the latent classes can be identified with SDLP and Sinn Féin respectively. Class 2, for example, is the only class in which there is a large conditional probability of reporting support for Sinn Féin, while in class 4 the conditional probability of reporting support for the SDLP is 0.94. As one might have expected, while classes 2 and 4 are both clearly nationalist, class 2 is more so. Ninety per cent of this class favour a united Ireland and only 1 per cent (not statistically significantly different from zero) favour retaining the Union, compared with 60 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, of class 4. Similarly, members of class 2 have a higher probability of considering themselves Nationalists. Only in respect of national identity (NINATID) is there no difference between these latent classes. Class 1 is least nationalist. Here the conditional probability of preferring a united Ireland is only 0.08, while for retaining the union it is 0.80. Likewise, members of this class have a probability of 0.87 of considering themselves neither nationalist nor unionist, and they are almost equally divided between those who consider themselves British and those who consider themselves Irish. However, reported party support among this group is heavily in favour of the SDLP, with a conditional probability of 0.67. While it might at first sight seem paradoxical that Catholics who prefer the union with Britain should support a nationalist party, this result is both well known 10 and understandable. On the one hand, Catholics have a distaste for unionist parties that stems from the period of Unionist hegemony under the Stormont regime. On the other, there is an absence of any party that would support the union while advancing Catholics' interests within Northern Ireland. The SDLP (which does seek to advance Catholics' interests) may therefore be supported by members of this class despite, rather than because of, its position on the constitutional issue.
The third latent class (and the second largest) seems, in the light of its pattern of conditional probabilities of responses, to be made up of Catholics who are somewhat alienated from the prevailing positions on the constitutional issue. Their modal response on this item is 'Other', rejecting both the retention of the union and a united Ireland. Similarly, they overwhelmingly think of themselves as neither Unionist nor Nationalist, and, although they tend to think of themselves as Irish, their modal response to the party support item is the non-committal or None category.
What do these results tell us? First, they identify very clearly a latent nationalist class (class 2) from which Sinn Féin's support is almost exclusively drawn. Nevertheless, within this class, only seven out of ten respondents admit to supporting Sinn Féin. A further 11 per cent say they support the SDLP, while 20 per cent place themselves in the None category. This suggests that there may indeed be some Sinn Féin supporters -up to 30 per cent -who do not report themselves as such in this survey. Secondly, none of the members of the other latent classes claim to support Sinn Féin with the exception of 6 per cent of the disaffected category, class 3. In particular, none of the members of classes 1 or 4 claim to support Sinn Féin. Thirdly, the analysis has uncovered not only a core group of SDLP supporters but also a second group from whom that party draws its support, but who might be characterized as 'Catholic unionists'.
11 Fourthly, the analysis has shown the distinctiveness of the disaffiliated group (latent class 3) whose existence, and relatively large size, have been revealed in earlier analyses using the NISA data. 12 Most importantly, however, we can contrast the numbers of respondents who state that they would support Sinn Féin and the SDLP with the sizes of the relevant latent classes. Whereas the ratio of stated SDLP to Sinn Féin support is, as noted earlier, 4.25:1, the relative sizes of the two latent classes are 2.1:1. If we consider that class 1 is also a class of 'true' SDLP supporters, the ratio increases to 2.9:1.
C O N C L U S I O N S
The under-reporting in surveys of support for parties viewed as holding extreme positions is pervasive. Any empirical analysis of the problem would, of course, have to address a range of possible causes, not least the possibility of the under-representation of such parties' supporters in survey samples, perhaps because of a propensity to refuse to be interviewed. This note has addressed another aspect of the issue: the degree to which party supporters misrepresent themselves when they are asked for their political preferences. I have suggested that LCA is a useful means of addressing this issue. Our application of latent class models to data from the 1996 NISM survey led us to identify four latent classes of Catholics in Northern Ireland, one of which, making up 18 per cent of the total, is clearly identifiable as comprising Sinn Féin supporters, just over two-thirds of whom say they would vote for that party in an election. If one supposes that members of this class are all Sinn Féin voters this explains around half of the shortfall in Catholic support for that party as recorded in the survey when compared with the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly in May 1996.
I want to conclude by suggesting, however, that the relationship between votes, survey responses and latent class membership is far from straightforward. Attempting to reconcile support for a party in an election and in a survey must be based on an assumption about the relationship between voting behaviour and party preferences, since without this there is no way to determine how much agreement there ought to be between elections and surveys. Clearly the simplest assumption is that people vote for their most preferred party -something we know is not always the case. In Northern Ireland the sectarian structure of political competition means that the first priority of many voters is to ensure that their constituency seat is won by someone from 'their own' side. This leads both to explicit and implicit agreements among parties on the same side of the Unionist/Nationalist divide concerning whether or not to field rival candidates and to a high level of tactical voting.
The other, related, issue to be taken into account is our implicit equating of latent classes with 'voting' classes. Each latent class comprises Catholics who share common positions on their constitutional preferences, sectarian allegiance and sense of national identity. These classes were then associated with political parties according to the degree to which these positions are those of the particular parties. Thus the class identified with Sinn Féin is so labelled because virtually all members of that class, independent of whether or not they say they support Sinn Féin, hold values that are strongly nationalist. In this sense latent classes have a strong claim to being the class (or classes, in the case of the SDLP) of core supporters of each party. This is distinct from considerations of actual voting (or non-voting) behaviour, which may be influenced not only by tactical questions but by a range of other factors, such as the personality of the candidates, their perceived ability to operate as a constituency MP and so forth. Not all those who vote for Sinn Féin (or for any other party for that matter) necessarily subscribe to its core values: for some the choice may be determined by considerations of who can best deal with the day-to-day problems of constituents. In this respect Sinn Féin's impressive network of advice centres and its provision of services to parts of the Catholic community may well have helped it to attract electoral support even from those who are not strongly nationalist.
Thus, while latent classes can help us to shed some light on the question of why surveys and elections disagree, we need to bear in mind that there may be good reasons why they should. Latent classes, although they can uncover some 'hidden' supporters of a party like Sinn Féin, identify classes of core supporters, rather than classes of voters. But this is a strength, rather than a weakness, of the LCA approach described here. It allows us to use the size of the latent class as a measure of support in the population for a party's core position or programme, as distinct from the number of votes it receives (which may be influenced by other factors). Although the results reported here suggest that latent classes can help to resolve some of the discrepancies in survey and electoral support for extreme parties, they are perhaps more useful as indicators of the underlying level of support for the policies they advocate.
